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SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE
Circuit's decisions and reasoning in Dellapia and "Language of Love"
are in full concert with such state of the law.
ZONING - EQUAL PROTECTION
Until recent years, urban life was comparatively simple; but with
the great increase and concentration of population, problems have
developed, and constantly are developing, which require, and will
continue to require, additional restrictions in respect to use and
occupation of private lands in urban communities.89
Inherent to the problem forseen by the Supreme Court in Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co.90 is the difficult task of providing equal protection
of the law to all citizens, and developing a viable community.91 Current
standards of equal protection demand a re-evaluation of zoning prin-
ciples. 92 Discretionary powers of local governments have always created
a deep concern about the constitutionality of zoning ordinances.9 3
Under this reasoning, it is significant that Dellapia did not involve an arbitrary postal
inspection, but rather evidence obtained from the recipient. While Dellapia's prosecution
would not, therefore, violate the Jackson rule, its vulnerability to a reasonable reading of
Stanley would remain.
89 Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). In this early case the Court
approved a comprehensive zoning ordinance. The village of Euclid had adopted a zoning
plan which was attacked as denying liberty and property without due process and denying
equal protection of the law. It was considered a liberal and tolerant attitude compared
to prior decisions of the period. See Ribble, The Due Process Clause as a Limitation on
Mutual Discretion in Zoning Legislation, 16 VA. L. ERv. 689, 699 (1930).
90272 US. 865 (1926).
91 See generally Note, Judicial Review of Displacee Relocation in Urban Renewal, 77
YArL L.J. 966, 967 (1968). The difficulty lies in the relationship of economic and racial
classes. Legislation which segregates economic classes by setting minimum building plots
or minimum values of particular areas are subject to constitutional scrutiny as contra-
dictory to traditional notions of equal protection. In Shelly v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1, 20
(1943), the Court stated that "freedom from discrimination by the States in enjoyment of
property rights" is imperative. When state action is inescapably adverse to the enjoy-
ment of this right, the city must show a compelling government interest in order to
overcome a finding of unconstitutionality. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
See also Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971 (1954); Adickes v. S.H.
Kress & Co., 252 F. Supp. 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
92 Different approaches to zoning have been used, all of which tend to discriminate
economically and therefore racially:
(1) Minimum size building lots. See Note, Large Lot Zoning, 78 YALE L.J. 1418 (1969).
This article contains a discussion of the efficiency, desirability and possible al-
ternatives of large lot zoning.
(2) Minimum floor space. See Note, Zoning for Minimum Standards, The Wayne
Township Case, HAav. L. Rxv. 1051, 1057 (1953), for a discussion of the rela-
tionship of state police power (health, safety, morals and welfare) to citizens and
certain zoning ordinances.
(3) Strict building codes which raise the cost of erection.
(4) Prohibition of multiple dwellings. See Babcock & Bosselman, Suburban Zoning
and the Apartment Boom, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 1040, 1062-68 (1963). See also Wil-
liams, Planning Law and Democratic Living, 20 Lmw & CONTEMP. PROB. 317, 331
(1955).
9 3 In Euclid, a land owner questioned the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance
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Furthermore, the clear division between state and private action has
become blurred and in many instances what might be seen as a private
or parochial development is labelled as state or state-supported action4
In establishing a denial of equal protection arising from municipal ser-
vices furnished to white and black communities, it is not necessary to
show actual intent or motive.9 5 Last year, in Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n
v. City of Lackawanna,96 the city government was charged with denying
equal protection of the law to minority groups of that city and violating
the Civil Rights Act 97 and the Fair Housing Act of 1968.98
The court found the city to be not unlike many other urban com-
munities. It was divided into three wards, the boundaries of which
were defined in the city charter. The first ward contained 98.9 percent
of the nonwhites living in Lackawanna. In contrast, the second ward
which set minimum lot sizes, maximum heights and prohibited apartment houses.
Although the court upheld the ordinance, it demanded that it not be arbitrary or un-
reasonable. 272 U.S. at 395. See Mandelker, Delegation of Power and Its Function in
Zoning Administration, 1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 60.
94 See Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968),
wherein the court explained
[e]qual protection of the laws means more than merely the absence of govern-
mental action designed to discriminate ... "we now firmly recognize the arbi-
trary quality of thoughtlessness can be as disastrous and unfair to private rights
and the public interest as the perversity of a willfull scheme."
395 F.2d at 931.
See also Jackson v. Goodwin, 400 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1968); United States ex rel. Seals v.
Wirman, 304 F.2d 53, 65 (5th Cir. 1962). Both of these cases demonstrates the extent to
which the court will go to discover the purpose to discriminate or intentional discrimina-
tion by state action. In Seals it was the systematic exclusion of Negroes from the grand
and petit jury. In Jackson it was the action of prison officials who denied petitioners the
right to receive Negro newspapers and magazines that was declared in violation of the
prisoners' fourteenth amendment rights; See Comment, 45 MicH. L. REv. 733 (1947).
95See Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. Lackawanna, 318 F. Supp. 669, 694 (2d Cir.
1970). The extensive testimony recorded by the lower court provided an excellent oppor-
tunity for this court to examine the complex problem and the effect of the city's
actions on minority groups.
96436 F.2d 108 (2nd Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971). Compare Southern
Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. Union City, 424 F.2d 291, 295 (9th Cir. 1970)
[hereinafter SASSO). In this case a city-wide referendum on zoning changes was contested
as being an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of the zoning power. The court did not
agree. It stated that the referendum was "far more than an expression of ambiguously
founded neighborhood preference" and the court labelled the action as a "traditional
right of direct legislation". Id. at 294. In Confederacion de la Raya Unida v. City of Mor-
gan Hill, 324 F. Supp. 895, 897 (N.D. Cal. 1971), the court stated that it should not
interfere except in the most extreme circumstances. In James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137
(1971), the Supreme Court reversed a district court decision that a referendum on low-
income housing violates the equal protection clause. The court felt that this procedure
provides the community with a valid means to voice an opinion in the development
of their community. The three dissenting judges felt that the California law, authorizing
the referendum, singled out low-income persons and therefore presented a clear violation
of equal protection guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.
9742 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
98 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et. seq. (1970).
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had only one nonwhite and the third ward only 29. The first ward was
described by the state planning studies9 as containing very poor en-
vironmental and structual conditions not adaptable to residential hous-
ing. It was, therefore, proposed that new, low-density extensions into
the third ward should begin. The proposal was met with concern over
the overloaded sewer conditions, the need for new schools and the
peoples' interest in protecting property values. The racial overtones
were clear to the city government.10 0 The Kennedy Park Homes As-
sociation then obtained a commitment from the Diocese of Buffalo to
purchase a plot of land with a view to constructing a low-income hous-
ing development.
At this time, the Lackawanna Zoning Board of Appeals and the
Planing and Development Board met and recommended a moratorium
on all new subdivisions until the sewerage problem was solved.1' 1 It
was also recommended that an area including the proposed low income
Kennedy Park subdivision be held open to provide park and recrea-
tional facilities. Both recommendations were accepted, an ordinance
was adopted, and Kennedy-Park Home Association and the Colored
Peoples' Civic and Political Organization commenced this action. Al-
though the moratorium ordinance was repealed, the Mayor refused to
allow the subdivision to tie into the city's sewer system.
The court of appeals, agreeing with the lower court, held that the
action of the city government and the entire situation in Lackawanna
was clearly in violation of the equal protection clause and the rights
guaranteed by Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. Relying on
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority10 2 and Reitman v. Mulkey 0 3
09 Actually three major studies were completed:
(I) The Model City application submitted by the City of Lackawanna to the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development; (2) The Master or Comprehensive Plan pre-
pared by Patrick Kane of KRS Associates, Inc.; and (3) A study of Parks and Recreation
for Lackawanna, prepared by the National Recreation and Parks Association. See generally
Norton, Elimination of Incompatible Uses and Structures, 20 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 305
(1955).
100 318 F. Supp. at 677. The first ward was considered by the Health Department as
a "high risk area"; tuberculosis was twice as prevalent, and infant mortality was much
higher than the other two sections. Crime rate was two and three times higher for
adult and juvenile offenders respectively.
10I The sewerage problem was very real in Lackawanna as noted in the Council
minutes over the prior decade. Id. at 680.
102 365 U.S. 715 (1961). See 6 L. Ed.2d 1302 (1961) for a complete discussion of the
Burton case and race discrimination. In the Burton case, the Court had found the state
of Delaware to be involved in racial discrimination when a parking building, owned and
operated by the city, rented one of its store fronts to a restaurant that refused to serve
food or drink to an individual solely because he was a Negro. For similar cases dealing
with restaurants in city and federal airports, see Adams v. City of New Orleans, 208
F. Supp. 427 (E.D. La. 1967); Coke v. City of Atlanta, 184 F. Supp. 579 (N.D. Ga. 1960);
Nash v. Air Terminal Services, 85 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Va. 1949).
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the court analyzed the plight of the first ward as a "specific authoriza-
tion" and continuous encouragement of racial discrimination, if not
almost complete racial segregation. The court was critical of the use of
discretionary zoning powers. 04 They examined not only the immediate
objective of the city's actions but also the ultimate effect and existing
conditions in Lackawanna. Great weight was given to the trial court's
determination. Viewing the man-made physical boundaries, the long
history of containment of the first ward,105 and finally the governmental
acts concerning the Kennedy subdivision, the court had little difficulty
in finding state-enforced discrimination.
In placing the responsibility on the state for providing decent liv-
ing standards for all of its citizenry, the court continues to follow the
trend set in recent decisions. 1 6 A state action will be subject to rigid
scrutiny notwithstanding any constitutionally accepted purpose.107 The
gross disparity in providing municipal services,108 as present in the
Kennedy case, is clearly a denial of equal protection whether the dis-
parity arises from intentional or purposeful discrimination. 10 9 The
103 387 U.S. 369 (1967). In the Reitman case, respondents sued under a California
statute which forbade racial discrimination in all business establishments. See also Horan,
Law and Social Change: The Dynamics of the State Action Doctrine, 17 J. PuB. L 258,
281 (1968). CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 51, 52 (Deering 1960).
104 As a basis of comparison, the Supreme Court's reluctance in accepting zoning or-
dinances traces back as far as Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909). This early case
held that a Massachusetts statute directly creating building heights in Boston didn't
deny equal protection of the law to land owners. But in Eubank v. Richmond, 226 US.
137 (1912), the Court refused to uphold an ordinance establishing a minimum distance
from building line to street line.
105 Lackawanna has only one bridge going into the first ward, and it is bounded
on the west by the Bethlehem Steel Plant situated on Lake Erie and on the east by a
series of railroad tracks. The Planning Consultant expressed it this way: "You have a
tremendous pressure building up in your community on the part of the nonwhites to
go across the bridge." 436 F.2d at 110.
106See Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir.
1968), where the court stated that a city may not escape responsibility for placing its
black citizens under a severe disadvantage which is unjustifiable. In the SASSO case,
supra note 96, the court demanded that not only facilities be provided in conformity with
the equal protection clause but also that they be provided as soon as they are provided
for anyone else. See generally Oyma v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); Note, Exclusionary
Zoning and Equal Protection, 84 HARv. L. Rav. 1645 (1971).
107 McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). There the Court concluded that be-
cause of a strong public policy, state action in this area is subject to rigid scrutiny. See
also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). In Loving the Court held that the equal
protection clause demands that racial classifications be subjected to the most rigid scrutiny.
108 See Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971). In Hawkins the
court held that in order to establish a denial of equal protection arising from disparities
in municipal services furnished to white and black communities it was not necessary
that actual intent or motive be proved.
109 Compare Powell v. Power, 436 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1970). This case involved the voting
rights of persons in a congressional primary. The court explained that uneven or erroneous
application of an- otherwise valid statute did not constitute a denial or equal protection
unless it was intentional or purposeful discrimination.
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courts continually strike out at subtle attempts to maintain a segregated
society, even when it is camouflaged as a legitimate use of a city's police
power. The trend is not to accept seemingly legitimate claims of city
governments as valid on their face. The court on its own initiative
searches into the depths of the problem to discover the true aim or effect
of the zoning ordinance. When, as in Kennedy, the court discovers such
a severe deficiency of equal protection, it will strike down the ordinance
as unconstitutional.
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY- ELEVENTH AMENDMENT11 °
The Second Circuit in Matherson v. Long Island State Park Com-
mission"' applied the landmark rule of Ex parte Young" 2 that actions
of a state officer may constitute a state action within the meaning of
the fourteenth amendment and at the same time be of an individual
character with respect to the eleventh amendment."13 Thus, while the
110 In England the doctrine of sovereign immunity was based on the theory that the
"King can do no wrong." But such an explanation has been specifically rejected in the
United States. Langford v. United States, 101 U.S. 341, 343 (1879). Mr. Justice Holmes
thought the doctrine to be based on "the logical and practical ground that there can
be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends."
Kawananakoa v. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349, 353, (1907). But this reasoning has now been
discredited. For a jurisprudential criticism, see Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in
Tort, V, 36 YALE LJ. 757 (1927). In Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), which
led to the adoption of the eleventh amendment, a citizen of one state was permitted to
maintain a suit against another state. The tenor of the opinion was that the idea of a
sovereign has no place in a republican form of government. The states, however, con-
cerned about being forced to pay huge war debts, were more interested in practice than
theory, and, as a result, the eleventh amendment was shortly ratified. See Pugh, His-
torical Approach to the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity, 13 LA. L. R-v. 476, 483-85
(1953).
3.11442 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1971).
112209 US. 123 (1908). United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882), established that
federal officers were not protected by sovereign immunity where there is an unconsti-
tutional deprivation of property. But on similar facts in Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643
(1962), the Court held that the doctrine was available. The Court there relied on Larson
v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 US. 682 (1949), which is considered a
modem-day extension of sovereign immunity. The rationale was that the Government
should not be excessively interfered with in its ordinary duties. K. DAvis, DAvis ON
ADMINISrRATIVE LAw 807-09 (1951); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINisTRATIVE ACTIoN
222-31 (1965). See generally Byse, Proposed Reforms in Federal "Nonstatutory" Judicial
Review: Sovereign Immunity, Indispensible Parties, Mandamus, 75 HAtv. L. REv. 1479,
1484 et seq. (1962). Larson may be relevant to Young to the extent that it affects the
concept of what constitutes an unconstitutional taking.
113 In Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824), the Court
held that when an officer is acting under a law that is unconstitutional, he is not acting as
an agent of the state and therefore the docrine of sovereign immunity is not applicable.
Prior to Young, however, a distinction had been made between an officer acting under a
specified statute and an officer exercising discretionary powers under the general laws of the
state. See Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516 (1894); In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887). Cf. Smyth
v. Ames, 169 US. 466 (1898); Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58 (1897); Reagan v. Farmers' Loan
& Trust Co., 154 US. 362 (1894); Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1 (1891); Allen v.
Baltimore & O.RL.R, 114 U.S. 311 (1884); Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270 (1884).
1972]
